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Digest: Marathon Entertainment, Inc. v. Blasi 
Alicia Jessop 
Opinion by Werdegar, J., expressing the unanimous view of the Court. 
Issues 
(1) Does the Talent Agencies Act, 1 which prohibits the solicitation or 
procurement of employment for actors and actresses, apply to personal 
managers as well as talent agents? 
(2) If so, does the doctrine of severability apply to manager talent 
contracts to allow partial enforcement when a manager has engaged in 
unlawful solicitation or procurement under the Act? 
Facts 
In 1998, Marathon Entertainment, Inc. and actress, Rosa Blasi entered 
into a contract for Marathon to act as her personal manager.2 Blasi agreed 
to pay Marathon a fifteen percent commission from her earnings from 
employment obtained during the course of the contract.3 Blasi appeared in 
a film and independently procured an appearance on a popular television 
show.4 Blasi allegedly reneged on her agreement to pay the commission 
she obtained from the show.5 She terminated her agreement and replaced 
Marathon with her licensed talent agent as her personal manager. 6 
Marathon sued Blasi for breach of oral contract, quantum meruit, false 
promise, and unfair business practice, seeking to recover unpaid 
commissions from the employment it had obtained for her. 7 After 
obtaining a stay of the action, Blasi filed a petition with the Labor 
Commissioner alleging that Marathon had violated the Talent Agencies Act 
(the "Act") by soliciting and procuring employment for her without a talent 
agency license. 8 The Labor Commissioner agreed, voiding her agreement 
with Marathon and barring it from recovery. 9 
I CAL. LAB. CODE§§ 1700-1700.47. 
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Marathon appealed the Labor Commissioner's ruling to the superior 
court for a trial de novo and amended its complaint and challenged the Act 
as a violation of a manager's state and federal constitutional rights. 10 The 
trial court granted Blasi's motion for summary judgment. 11 
The Court of Appeal reversed in part. 12 The court found that, while 
the Act applied to personal managers, the obligation to pay the commission 
to Marathon for the television show could be severed from any unlawful 
portion of the parties' agreement because the agreement had the lawful 
purpose of providing services unregulated by the Act. 13 The California 
Supreme Court granted review. 14 
Analysis 
I. The Applicability of the Talent Agencies Act to Managers 
The Court first noted that the line between talent agents, who 
negotiate contracts for artists, and managers, who provide a broader range 
of services, is "often blurred and sometimes crossed." 15 The Act, in 
coordination with guild regulation, strictly applies to talent agents but not 
necessarily personal managers. 16 The Legislature abandoned the creation 
of a licensing scheme applicable to personal managers. 17 
The Act requires anyone who solicits or procures employment for 
artists to have a talent agency license. 18 To solidify this requirement, the 
Act sets forth requirements for how licensed talent agencies run their 
business. 19 The Act has a safe harbor provision for managers to solicit or 
procure employment if they do so in coordination with a licensed agent.20 
The central concern of the Act is to prevent exploitation of artists by their 
representatives. 21 
The Court began its analysis with the relevant language of Section 
1700.5 of the Act: "No person shall engage in or carry on the occupation of 
a talent agency without first procuring a license therefore from the Labor 
Commissioner."22 The Court noted that the Act defines "person" as "any 
individual, company, society, firm, partnership, association, corporation, 
limited liability company, manager, or their agents or employees . .'m The 
10 !d. 




15 !d. at 743. 
16 /d. at 745-46. 
17 !d. at 746. 
18 /d. at 747 (citing CAL. LAB. CODE§§ 1700.4, 1700.5 (2008)). 
19 !d. (citing CAL. LAB. CODE§§ 1700.23~1700.47 (2008)). 
20 ld. at 746 (citing former CAL. LAB. CODE§ 1700.44). 
21 !d. 
22 !d. at 747 (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE§ 1700.5 (2008)) (emphasis added). 
23 !d. (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700 (2008)) (emphasis added). 
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Act defines "talent agency" as "a person or corporation who engages in the 
occupation of procuring, offering, promising, or attempting to procure 
employment or engagements for an artist or artists."24 
The Court reasoned that the Act regulates the conduct of procuring or 
soliciting and not the title of the business.25 Thus, the Court stated, "[a]ny 
person who procures employment-any individual, any corporation, any 
manager-is a talent agency subject to regulation."26 The Court stated that, 
under the Labor Commissioner's decisions, to any extent that a personal 
manager solicits or procures employment--even on an incidental or 
occasional basis-the manager must be licensed under the Act. 27 
2. The Applicability of Severability to Manager Talent Contracts 
The Court first noted that, while the Act is silent on the proper remedy 
for illegal procurement, the Act was not in conflict with Civil Code section 
1599, which sets forth the doctrine of severability.28 The Court found that 
the Labor Commissioner and Court of Appeal decisions recognized that the 
severability doctrine may apply to disputes under the Act. 29 The Court 
reasoned that courts must consider the main purposes of the agreement; "if 
they determine in a given instance that the parties intended for the 
representative to function as an unlicensed talent agency or that the 
representative engaged in substantial procurement activities that are 
inseparable from managerial services, they may void the entire contract. "30 
The Court stated that the doctrine was equitable and fact-specific and 
deferred to the discretion of the Labor Commissioner or the courts to 
determine whether it was applicable.31 
Holding 
The Court held that ( 1) the Act applies to managers as well as agents; 
(2) the Labor Commissioner has the authority to void manager-talent 
contracts for unlawful procurement or to apply the doctrine of severability 
to partially enforce them; and (3) a genuine dispute of material fact existed 
over whether severability might apply to allow partial enforcement of the 
parties' contract. 32 
24 !d. (citing CAL. LAB. CODE§ 1700.4 (a) (2008)) (emphasis added). 
25 !d. 
26 /d. (citing Cal. Lab. Code§§ 1700, 1700.4(a)). 
27 !d. at 74 7-48. 
28 /d. at 750-51. 
29 /d. at 751-52. 
30 /d. at 755. 
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Legal Significance 
As a result of this case, unlicensed talent managers in Hollywood must 
beware that they will not be compensated for their acts of procurement or 
solicitation of the talent they represent without a talent agency license. 
They may rest assured, however, that individual and isolated acts of 
solicitation or procurement will not void the entire agreement, as these acts 
may be severed from the rest of the agreement. The doctrine is fact 
specific and thus, the Labor Commissioner may opt not to apply it when it 
appears as though a manager has assumed the role of an agent. 
